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Local government cooperation at work: A control function
approach ∗
Zineb Abidi  Edoardo di Porto  Angela Parenti § Sonia Paty ¶
Abstract. We analyze voluntary coalition formation using a unique panel data for 1,056 municipalities
in the French region of Brittany between 1995 and 2002. We use a control function approach to develop a
binary discrete choice model with spatial interactions. We find that a municipality’s decision to cooperate
over the provision local public goods depends on the decisions of its neighbours. Comparison with spatial
econometrics models (SAR and Durbin) shows that the decision to cooperate is over estimated by these
more traditional models. The results are in line with the recent applied spatial economics literature but
are derived for a discrete choice model setting.
Keywords: Inter-municipal cooperation; panel data; control function.
JEL codes: C3, H2, H4, H7
1 Introduction
Local government fragmentation raises several issues, such as efficient provision of local public services.
A common response to inefficient delivery is the implementation among municipalities of consolidation
programs. There are several examples of inter-municipal cooperation in Europe specially among northern
European countries. For example, in the case of Finland, the number of municipalities has decreased
sharply since the 1940’s (Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2010) and in Denmark the number of municipalities was
reduced from 271 to 98 in 2007. In recent decades, inter-municipal cooperation plans have been introduced
by many countries around the world such as China (Hinnerich, 2009; Weese, 2009), Canada where the
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number of municipalities halved between 1996 and 2001 (Poel, 2000), and Israel where amalgamation
reform was conducted in 2003 (Reingewertz, 2012). In the theoretical literature, work on political economy
includes several papers focusing on the optimal size of a coalition and her characteristics (see e.g. Bolton
and Roland, 1997; Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, 2003, 2005, 2006; Brasington, 1999, 2003a, 2003b; Blume
and Blume, 2007; Gordon and Knight, 2009; Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2010; Weese, 2011, Lago-Penas
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2013). These studies show that nations are more likely to integrate if levels of
income are comparable and voters have similar political preferences. In the context of within states, there
are similar issues which are addressed mostly by work on fiscal federalism. 1
With the exception of Hulst et al. (2009), 2 most of this work focuses mainly on municipality mergers
which cause municipalities to disappear following a coalition. In the French setting, the municipalities
continue to exist as entities after joining an inter-municipal body in a functional cooperation. Following
the existing literature, we argue that if a municipality has a choice between remaining independent
or joining a community, the political, economic, and socio-demographic environment may influence the
cooperation decision in a variety of ways. Also, the cooperation decision is strongly dependent on what
neighbors decide since by law, an inter-municipal community must include just contiguous localities. If
no neighbors already cooperate, the probability of joining an inter-municipal community will be lower
than if close neighbors already cooperating. This allows us to use a discrete choice model in which the
decision to cooperate is affected by the spatial weighted average decisions of the municipality’s neighbors.
The main aim of the paper therefore, is to estimate the impact of neighbors’ cooperation decisions on
municipal decision-making, using a spatial binary discrete choice model and controlling for the political
and socio-economic environment.
Recent work on spatial interaction models discusses the validity and accuracy of traditional spatial
econometrics techniques (Gibbons and Overman, 2012) and provides new evidence on the advantages of
instrumental variables (IV) methods. In the case of a linear spatial lag model, Lyytikainen (2012) shows
how the use of IV methods associated with careful choice of IV can result in more reliable estimates
of the spatial interaction term 3. In the context of fiscal interaction, the estimation results are lower
than the results from a traditional spatial econometric methods, suggesting that the latter overestimate
the size of the spatial interaction coefficient. According to Gibbons and Overmans (2012) this result is
likely driven by the fact that traditional methods weakly identify the causal effect of the spatial weighted
1. Since the seminal article by Tiebout (1956), numerous articles show that fragmentation can have positive effects since
small governments achieve a better matching between expenditure allocation and local preferences. Therefore, the problem
of optimal size in the production of local public goods can be modelled as arbitrage between the welfare gains expected
from small localities and the economies of scale expected from the production of public services within a larger jurisdiction
(Oates, 1972).
2. Hulst et al. (2009), in a comparative study involving eight European countries, analyze the shift in institutional
arrangements for inter-municipal cooperation agreements that provide such joint local public goods.
3. In a similar study, Baskaran (2014) finds very similar results for North Rhine Westphalia and Lower Saxony
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component. 4 Exploiting exogenous variations from policy changes, therefore seem the most appropriate
method to derive valid exclusion restrictions in tax competition setting. This paper follows the reasoning
in Lyytikainen (2012) but advances the binary discrete choice model case.
In the discrete choice model literature (especially in a panel framework) the counterpart of the IV
method is control function. Paapke (2005) and Paapke-Wooldridge (2008) have extensively investigated
the case of panel data method for a fractional response dependent variable. We follow their control
function strategy to develop a binary choice model with spatial interaction. In particular, we treat the
spatial interaction as endogenously determined, and we solve it by imposing exclusion restrictions derived
from the French institutional setting. That is, we exploit the exogenous variation determined by a national
statutory (upper) tax limit.
The use of control function in this context has many advantages. Firstly, discrete choice models
with spatial interaction are computationally intensive (LeSage, 2000; Pinkse and Slade, 1998). Maximum
likelihood optimization is complicated because it requires the inversion of large matrices. When the
number of observations grows, convergence can become unfeasible (Klier and McMillen, 2008). Control
function is a simple and well-known procedure, which is suited to large panel data, given that it involves
only linear regressions and standard probit or Generalized Linear Model (GLM) methods in a binomial
family. Also, control function can control for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity via Mundlack-
Chamberlain devices (Paapke-Wooldridge, 2008), and thus introduce fixed effects without any differencing
transformation, which can be computationally intensive. Klier and McMillen (2008) acknowledged the
computational complexity of discrete choice spatial interaction models, and developed the alternative
Spatial Logit for Large Sample estimator, which is a GMM procedure that combines logit and two-stage
least square estimation. However, as they show in a series of Montecarlo simulations, their procedure tends
to overestimate the spatial correlation coefficient. For comparison we use their method in our context
and we show that a naive control function a la Wooldridge performs better. 5
By applying our estimation strategy to a panel of French municipalities, we find that the decision
of municipalities to cooperate over the provision of local public goods depends on the decisions of their
neighbours. In particular, the probability of cooperating with neighboring municipalities is higher if the
latter already provide joint local public goods. However, a common political ”color” is not a specific in-
centive to cooperate. The comparison between control function, maximum likelihood and GMM estimates
shows that control function performs better.
4. The typical estimation strategy in the case of spatial autoregressive component is maximum likelihood or IV general
method of moment (GMM) methods. According to Gibbons and Overman (2012), although specification of the former is
difficult, in the latter there is weak identification due to the use of non relevant instruments (i.e., the typical IV strategy
implemented using spatial weighted average covariates or spatial weighted average lagged dependent variable as exclusion
rectriction).
5. Although Klier and McMillen (2008) develop the estimator for the Logit regression, McMillen(2010) also provides the
estimator for the probit in the R package McSpatial.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the conditions for voluntary cooperation among
local governments. Section 3 presents the French institutional context and describes the national rule
for tax limitation. The empirical model is discussed in section 4. Section 5 presents the results of our
estimation and section 6 concludes.
2 Conditions for voluntary cooperation among local govern-
ments
A number of political economy models address the incentives to cooperate. 6 For example, Bolton and
Roland (1997) and Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2005, 2006) study the compromise in economies of scale
that encourages cooperation and the problem of heterogeneity of preferences that promotes dissolution,
which together determines the optimal size of a given coalition. Nations are shown to be more likely to
integrate if they have comparable levels of income and their voters share close political preferences.
Within a state, Oates (1972) points out that the formation of a coalition internalizes inter-jurisdictional
spillovers externalities and can be a solution to the problem of free riding. The motivation for coalition
formation within a country has also attracted considerable interest from theoretical and empirical econo-
mists. Borge and Rattso (2002) confirm that in Norway, political strength, measured by the fragmentation
of parties and types of coalition, is important for growth and influences decentralized spending and the
formation of agreements. Also for Norway, Sorensen (2006) shows the impact of political transaction
costs on voluntary local government mergers. He identifies the role of state grants, revenue disparities
and expected changes to party strengths after unification, in merging proocess. Gordon and Knight (2009)
and Weese (2011) propose structural econometric methods to analyze spatial mergers. Where a merger
is decided voluntarily by the municipal councils, they show that the local political environment plays an
important role in the mergers decision. These authors point out also that political fragmentation can be
an obstacle to the formation of coalitions and conclude that the political environment can discourage
optimal coalition formation. Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2010), using Finnish municipal data, study the
case of mergers that were decided independently at the local level, and analyze empirically the coalition
formation of local governments. Using a novel reduced form econometric procedure that allows for multi-
partner mergers, they find that the decision to cooperate or merge depends on the preferences of voters,
and that mergers are much less likely if the distance between median voter in the coalition and the center
is large. They argue that in order to reduce political competition and to be re-elected, councillors seems
to prefer mergers.
6. Issues related to coalition formation and analysis of bargaining are the subject of number of theoretical studies of
game theory, which are beyond the scope of the present study (see e.g. Myerson, 1978; Shenoy, 1979; Aumann and Myerson,
1988; Ray and Vohra, 1999; Bloch and al., 2006).
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Since we want to address a specific class of cooperation where municipalities continue to exist as entities
after joining an inter-municipal body, we address three factors that are key to functional cooperation
decision-making: economic, political and socio-demographic determinants.
Although improved cost efficiency is a major incentive for consolidation, it is one of the most difficult
key elements for the municipality to assess a priori (Sorensen, 2006). To assess the trade-off between
remaining isolated and cooperating, a municipality will compare its revenue with what can be expected
after joining the inter-municipal community. Therefore, we expect that if a municipality has higher levels
of (exogenous) revenues than her potential partners, it may be opposed to cooperation to avoid revenue
sharing with poorer municipalities. Inversely, a relatively poor (in terms of fiscal revenues) municipality
will have more incentives to share the resources with richer neighbours.
Citizens of neighbouring municipalities may have more or less close policy preferences. The political
costs associated with larger, more heterogenous jurisdictions have been the subject of long debate (So-
rensen, 2006). The new local official in the case of merger may pursue a different policy to those pursued
by former separates localities, leading to loss of allocation effectiveness (Oates, 1972). In the case of
functional cooperation where former jurisdictions do not disappear, the political factor may not be less
strategic than in the case of merger case. Although cooperation among local governments to provide joint
local public goods is also more likely if voters share close political preferences, each municipality retains
autonomy for the provision of specific municipal public goods. A cooperating municipality can transfer
some spending to the inter-municipal community but retain many important competences (such as local
urban services, buildings, nursery provision, primary schools, and municipal roads maintenance), which
respond to specific local preferences.
The socio-demographic characteristics of municipalities are closely related to economic and political
determinants. First, the larger the municipality’s population, the greater will be its local public needs
and the greater will be the spillovers of public goods to neighboring localities. Free riding behavior from
citizens who do not live in a city but benefit from its public good delivery provides a dense jurisdiction
with a greater incentive to share or transfer to the inter-municipal group some competences and associa-
ted supply of services. Second, the prospect of shared social responsabilities (e.g. for elderly people) could
also be a strong motive for some municipalities to join an inter-municipal agreement. However, the pro-
vision of social services is not ordained by law for inter-municipal communities. Moreover, elderly people
are less sensitive to investment by inter-municipal jurisdictions (sport facilities, public transport, road
investment). A high proportion of elderly people can influence the probability of cooperation negatively.
Finally, we can conclude that if a municipality has a choice between remaining independent or joining
a community, the political, economic, and socio-demographic environment may influence the cooperation
decision in a variety of ways. Neighborhood characteristics in terms of economics (e.g. per capita fiscal
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revenues), politics (political affiliation) and demography are key factors that need to be addressed to
understand the cooperation decision. To this context, the French experience is an interesting case.
3 The French institutional context
France is a very fragmented country; since the lowest layer of local government consists of more than
36,700 municipalities and the French local institutional context is characterized by three overlapping
tiers of local government. The middle tier consists of 96 counties or de´partements; the top tier consists
of the 22 French regions. Municipalities are responsible for local urban services, buildings, provision of
nurseries, primary schools, sports facilities, maintenance of municipal roads, and urban public transport.
The counties administer social assistance; and maintain county roads and middle schools. Regions are
responsible for provision of vocational training, economic development, and building and maintenance of
high schools.
Local revenues come mainly from taxation (54%), block grants (23%), and borrowing. The local
business tax (Taxe Professionnelle) 7 is the major source of local government tax revenues, accounting
for approximately 45% of the revenue derived from direct local taxes. The tax base consists mainly of
capital goods and is related to the rental values of buildings, and of equipment (assumed to be 16% of
the equipment cost). The remaining tax revenues are collected from households in the form of residential
tax (taxe d’habitation), property tax (taxe foncie`re sur le baˆti), and land tax (taxe foncie`re sur le non
baˆti”). All municipalities receive a state grant, related to various criteria including population and tax
bases.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, several laws on local cooperation have been passed to solve the
problem of municipal fragmentation:
● The law of February 6, 1992 established the basis of inter-municipal cooperation in order to promote
economic development.
● The law of July12, 1999 known as the “Che`venement law”, is one of the main laws encouraging conso-
lidation of inter-municipal cooperation in France.
● A government reform, in 2010, enforced all municipalities to join an inter-municipal structure before
January 1 , 2014.
In France, responsibility for creating inter-municipal communities (‘Etablissement public de coope´ration
intercommunale or EPCI ) is left to the municipalities, which (before 2010) could cooperate with the mu-
nicipality of their choice. However, this cooperation currently is governed by “the principle of territorial
7. This tax, which was related mainly to private capital, was removed in 2010 and replaced by a territorial economic
contribution based on property and firm value added.
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contiguity”. 8
Local cooperation is expected to i) reduce local public spending through the achievement of substantial
economies of scale in the production of some local public goods such as public transport, cultural and
sports facilities etc. (mainly investment spending) and ii) limit fiscal and spending inequalities among
member municipalities. These objectives are achieved through the transfer of some tax and spending
powers from the municipalities to the corresponding inter-municipal group.
The inter-municipal community is managed by a board of delegates elected by member munici-
palities from their local councillors based on an absolute majority. Therefore, unlike municipalities,
“de´partements” or regions, inter-municipal jurisdictions operate under indirect democracy and are a
decision-making rather than a strict administrative level. Each municipality must have at least one seat
on the council, and no single municipality can hold more than half of the inter-municipal council seats.
Local cooperation has been widely promoted by government based on financial incentives. In 1999,
the inter-municipal community was awarded a new state grant 9 (based mainly on community population
and inter-municipal tax bases) and new tax revenues. Inter-municipal communities apply tax additional
to the four municipal taxes (business, residential, property and land taxes) or set a single business tax
(SBT) or Taxe Professionnelle Unique rate. 10 If the municipality chooses to impose a SBT, it loses the
right to set her own business tax rate but can still set the rate for the three household taxes (residential,
property and land taxes).
To impose centralized control over tax rate dispersion, France implemented a municipal tax limitation.
In this paper, we focus on the national tax limit set for the local business tax (LBT) or Taxe Profession-
nelle according to which the LBT which is set each year, cannot exceed twice the previous year’s average
business tax rates computed for all French municipal business tax rates (see details in Appendix A).
Therefore each year municipalities receive notification of the upper tax limit, which must be respected
when setting their annual business tax rate. Since the tax limit is computed at the national level each year
in a process that involves around 36,500 municipalities it is impossible for a single municipality to control
the tax cap. Below, we explain how we use the exogenous distance to the tax cap or rather, its weighted
spatial average - the average spatial weighted difference between the tax rate and the current limit -
as an exclusion restriction to provide a better identification of the spatial weighted average cooperation
variable.
We employ a panel data set of 1,056 municipalities in the French region - Brittany - over a period of 8
years (1995-2002). The choice of this region is justified by its geographical position: Brittany occupies the
8. A municipality must cooperate with any locality with which it has at least one common border.
9. Note that this state grant attributed to the inter-municipal community coexists with the state grant attributed to the
municipality. The latter remains unchanged whether the locality cooperates or not.
10. During the period of our study, there was a third - marginal - case, which was a mixed case where the community sets
a single business tax rate and an additional tax rate on households. The community received tax revenue from households
and business while municipality i sets a tax only on households.
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northwest peninsula of continental Europe in northwest France. It is bordered by the English Channel
to the north, and the Atlantic Ocean to the west and south. Thus, Brittany is affected by its borders
with other regions to only a small extent. Note also that there is no specificity in this region concerning
inter-municipal communities since the laws on local cooperation are national laws.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the municipalities that entered into an inter-municipal agreement between 1996
and 2002. Inter-municipal cooperation in this period was quite successful due mainly to the allocation of
a new community level state grant. However, some municipalities remained independent. Our aim is to









Figure 2 – 2002
4 Econometric approach
Since by law local governments in France are free to decide to join an inter-municipal group if they
share a common border, this allows us to use a discrete choice model. In addition, municipalities continue
to exist as entities after joining an inter-municipal body (Di Porto et al., 2013). Therefore, the starting
point of our econometric approach is a standard binary discrete choice model where the dependent variable
Ci,t is given by:
Ci,t = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if municipality i cooperates at time t
0 otherwise
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The reduced form of our panel data model is:
Ci,t = φ(α + βX ′i,t + ui,t) (1)
where i is the index of municipalities, t is an index of the time dimension, Xi,t is the matrix of the
covariates, β is the vector of coefficient, ui,t is the error term, and φ is a normal distribution.
Allowing for the possibility that the error term includes unobserved fixed municipal characteristics,
the model can be written as:
Ci,t = φ(α + βX ′i,t + ηi + ei,t) (2)
where ηi = x¯i = T −1∑T xi,t are Mundlack-Chamberlain transformations controlling for the unobserved
time-invariant individual effect and eit is an independently and identically distributed error term. Paapke
and Wooldridge (2008) show that under conditional normality assumptions, the estimation of fixed effect
using covariates time average is straightforward.
To assess the neighborhood effects on the decision to cooperate, we consider a spatial specification for
our panel probit model including the spatial lag of the dependent variable as a regressor, ∑Nj=1wijCj,t,
i.e. the weighted average on its neighbors’ values. In this case, neighboring municipalities will be those
that are either geographically or geo-politically close (see Appendix 2 for details). 11
The spatial probit model with fixed effects is therefore given by:
Ci,t = φ(ρ N∑
j=1wijCj,t + βX ′i,t + ηi + ei,t); (3)
where N is the number of municipalities, wi,j is an element of the weight matrix W indicating whether
observations i and j are neighbors, and ∑Nj=1wijCj,t is the spatial lag of the dependent variable. We
choose to estimate a spatial lag model, but also perform a Durbin model specification. 12
The form of the spatial Durbin model becomes:
Cit = φ(ρ N∑
j=1wijCj,t + βX ′i,t + γ N∑j=1wi,jX ′jt + ηi + ei,t) (4)
where∑Nj=1wijX ′it is the matrix of spatially lagged explanatory variables with associated parameter vector
11. For reasons of space, we show only the results for the spatial distance-based weight matrix with a distance cut-off
equal to the 1st quantile of the sample distance distribution (equal to 59 km). The robustness of the findings to weight
matrices with alternative cut-offs were also tested. Results are available upon request.
12. As observed by Gibbons and Overman (2012) Durbin and spatial econometric models SEM are equivalent under a set
of nonlinear common factor constraints on the coefficients. Therefore, we aim with this choice to cover all the traditional
spatial specification, given that SLX and SEM models are not the main focus of the analysis and cannot be estimated using
a control function approach.
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γ. In particular, the coefficient β measures the influence of municipality’ i’s characteristics on municipality
i’s decision to cooperate, while the coefficient γ measures the impact of neighbors’ characteristics on i’s
cooperation decision. In both equations (3) and (4) we include in X
′
i,t year dummies in order to control
for year fixed effects.
We estimate equation (3) and (4) using different techniques and within different specifications. Firstly,
we estimate a fixed effect spatial lag (Durbin) model using a linear probability model (LPM). In this case
we remove ηi, which are redundant given that we control for municipalities fixed effects using demeaned
variables (see Elhorst, 2003).
Secondly, we perform the linearized GMM (L-GMM) procedure in Klier and McMillen (2008). The
technique is intriguing since the model in principle performs a non linear estimation and, is first linearised
around the convenient starting point ρ = 0. In this way it is possible to perform a standard probit
model followed by two-step least squares to obtain consistent estimates of the spatial lag coefficient. This
procedure uses traditional ∑Nj=1w2i,jX ′jt as exclusions restriction (where w2i,j are the elements of the W 2
matrix) and can be extended to the panel case including Mundlack-Chamberlain devices. The procedure
is also sufficiently flexible to allow for additional external instrument.
Our last specification is probably the simplest in terms of computing time. We apply control function
(CF) method considering ∑Nj=1wijCj,t as an endogenously determined variable. In particular, we use
a two-step procedure where: i) firstly, we regress the endogenous variable ∑Nj=1wijCj,t on instruments,
exogenous covariates and time average covariates, and we obtain the residuals νˆi,t; ii), we include those
residuals in the original regression, that is (for the spatial lag case):
Ci,t = φ(ρ N∑
j=1wi,jCj,t + βX ′i,t + ηi + ei,t + νˆi,t) (5)
This last model can be estimated as a Generalised Linear Model (binomial family) and under fairly
standard conditions produces consistent estimate of ρ. 13 Also in this last case we can use traditional
W 2Xj,t exclusion restrictions. As previously mentioned, exploiting exogenous variation deriving from
policy shocks, fiscal or spatial rules, we get estimates of ρ that are more restrained (smaller) and more
credible. This was proved for the case of continuous dependent variable by Lyytikainen (2012). However
both the CF and the L-GMM model allow for the inclusion of external instruments of this kind, allowing
the interesting possibility of testing this type of relevant instrument in the discrete choice case. We exploit
the exogenous variation from a French fiscal rule and we add a new instrument to the exclusion restriction
set. Before discussing our results in section 4.1 we explain the identification strategy in more detail and
discuss neighbors decisions and other control variables in subsection 4.2.
13. Given that the second-step regression involves a generated regressor, i.e. the first stage residual, we follow Paapke and
Wooldridge (2008) and compute the standard errors for the average partial effect via bootstrap. See Appendix D for details.
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4.1 Identification strategy
France has set various ways to control local tax competition, through the imposition of central rules
and a tax limitation. The most interesting in our context is the national tax limitation imposed on the
(LBT) or Taxe Professionnelle (see Appendix A for details). This tax is levied by different levels of local
governments and constitutes one of the main tax revenue sources for local governments. The average
LBT, computed for all French municipalities and, multiplied by 2, constitutes the upper tax limit (TL)
for business tax. Given a certain national of TL, not all municipalities have the same freedom to set their
specific LBT and for some it is impossible to increase tax rates. By computing the difference between
actual LBT and the tax limitation imposed on municipality for each year in our sample, we get an
indicator of fiscal freedom, which is a suitable instrument for our purposes.
The decision to cooperate therefore, is related to both tax revenues and tax freedom. To clarify
the relevance of our instrument (i.e. its ability to predict the endogenous variable), let us consider a
municipality, which has already reached the exogenous upper bound of the LBT rate. Cooperation might
provide her with some policy leeway to increase higher future revenues that otherwise would be constrained
by the upper bound imposed and the fact that the tax base can be considered fixed in the short run.
Given the institutional setting, some municipalities have less freedom than others. This creates an
exogenous constraint on the cooperation decision making process. It should be noted that this constraint is
space and time varying, which should help its identification. Note also that the tax limitation rules is based
on a process that involves all 36,500 municipalities in France; therefore, an individual municipality will be
marginal in the decision process and the possibility for her to control the national tax limitation through
a strategic change in her tax rate will be very unlikely; this ensures instrument validity . Consequently,
if Fi.t = LBTi,t − TLi,t is our indicator of tax freedom ∑Nj=1wi,jZi,t = ∑Nj=1wi,jFj,t will be our additional
exclusion restriction for∑Nj=1wi,jCj,t. It should be noted that∑Nj=1wi,jZi,t, which is a weighted average tax
freedom indicator, is a suitable instrument for the spatial correlation coefficient. Intuitively this means
that the spatial endogenous component is predicted in part by a spatial process that is exogenously
determined by the national fiscal rule. De facto, some of the cooperating neighbors in each municipality
have chosen cooperation for exogenous motivations, that is because their tax rates were close or equal to
the tax cap.
4.2 Neighboring decisions and other control variables
In order to estimate the impact of neighbors cooperation decisions on municipal decision-making, and
following the literature on voluntary cooperation decisions the cooperation decision (a discrete choice
variable taking the value 1 in the event of voluntary cooperation) is regressed on its spatially lagged value
11
(with spatial weights given by either pure geographical distance or geo-political distance), and on a set
of control variables proxying for economic, socio-demographic, and political characteristics. 14
First, the cooperation decision is strongly dependent on what neighbors decide since by law, an inter-
municipal community must include just contiguous localities. If no neighbors cooperate, the probability
of joining an inter-municipal community will be lower than if close neighbors already cooperating. We can
also expect some mimicking behavior related to cooperation from local officials who might believe it would
be stigmatising to remain isolated when most neighboring localities have signed an intergovernmental
agreement. Citizens/voters may become aware of new public services provided by a community (e.g.
public transport, cultural and sports facilities) and may put pressure on their local government to join
the community. 15 Officials might recognize that remaining isolated from an existing close community
(which provides a range of good public services to firms and households) could lead to capital flight
from the territory. Tax base mobility might explain the propensity of officials to imitate the cooperation
decisions of neighbors. 16 It is likely also that municipalities, when deciding whether or not to cooperate,
will mimic neighbours’ behavior following the trend suggested by Manski (1993). We can expect also that
obtaining information on cooperation (expected revenues, expected state grant, etc.) will be easier for
an independent municipality located next to a group of cooperating municipalities. Mimicking behaviour
related to cooperation is likely to be observed in this context. The literature on local fiscal decision-making
provides extensive developments on this kind of spatial spillover and its identification (Brueckner, 2003).
We are aware also that geographical distance is not the only factor in our case. Citizens of neighboring
localities do not necessarily have the same policy preferences. As argued before, where a municipality has a
choice between remaining isolated or joining a community, politics may have an impact on the cooperation
decision in a variety of ways. If a municipality is surrounded by independent localities, the creation of
an inter-municipal community is more likely to happen if the neighboring local officials are of the same
political belief. For a municipality that is spatially contiguous to an existing community, a positive
decision to join this community will be more likely if the president of the inter-municipal council (elected
by local councillors from member municipalities) belongs to the municipality’s ruling party. However,
in France, functional cooperation is different from a merger: the cooperating municipalities continue to
exist as entities after joining an inter-municipal body and the cooperating municipality mayors remain
in post after the creation of the inter-municipal jurisdiction. They retain some bargaining power within
the community and some strategic competences within their particular municipal territory (such as local
urban services, buildings, nurseries, primary schools, sports facilities). Therefore, political factors may be
14. Descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix B.
15. The argument is similar to a yardstick competition models (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995) where incumbents
imitate the public decisions of their neighbors to stand for reelection.
16. This is a tax competition argument.
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less important in the French context compared to the Northern European countries.
Since more than 80% of french municipalities are very small (less than 2,000 inhabitants), many French
mayors do not have a political affiliation and do not want to be associated with a particular political
party. Therefore the political color of the municipal government is not directly observable and there is
no political data set for these small municipalities. To proxy for political affiliation, we use the results of
the first round of the presidential elections since these are more likely to represent real affiliation. This
variable comes from the board of elections (”Bureau des E´lections et E´tudes politiques, Ministere de
l’Interieur”). During our period of study, there were two municipal elections (in 1995 and in 2002) but
only one presidential election in 1995. We therefore consider a constant municipal political affiliation over
time. In 1995, 546 municipalities could be considered right-wing and 510 localities left-wing.
To capture the political environment of each municipality i, we construct a geo-political matrix as
follows. Based on each municipality’s leaning (right or left-wing), we assigned a value of 0.5 to the
municipalities that voted for a right-wing candidate and -0.5 to the municipalities that voted for a left-
wing candidate. We build a political matrix where each element takes the value of 1 if two municipalities
are of the same political leaning and 0 otherwise (Pij = 1 if both municipalities i and j have the same
political colour and Pij = 0 otherwise). Third, since we want to take account of the political environment
of each municipality, we compute the interaction between the geographic and political matrices to obtain
our geo-political matrix (see Appendix C for details).
To assess the trade-off between remaining isolated and cooperating, a municipality will compare
its revenue with what can be expected after joining the inter-municipal community (Sorensen, 2006).
However, efficiency improvements in the production costs of local public goods may be difficult to evaluate.
Therefore, if a locality has a higher level of fiscal revenues (per capita) than its potential partners, it
will be less likely to cooperate. We argue that a municipality makes its decision at time t on the basis
of the level of its fiscal revenues (i.e. the sum of its tax revenues and the per capita state grant) at time
t-1. We expect that a high level of fiscal revenues at time t-1 will reduce the probability of joining the
community whereas a financially poor locality will have a greater incentives to forge an agreement with
neighboring localities. The obvious financial gains from cooperation (from the extra state grant) and
the provision of extra public goods are counterbalanced by each cooperating municipality’s loss of some
fiscal autonomy through devolution of competences and tax revenues to the community. In entering a
cooperative agreement with other localities, a relatively “rich” municipality loses control over a part of
its revenues, which are redistributed among the entire community.
We also include the following explanatory variables: population density, and share of elderly people
in municipality i. We expect a positive sign of density for the following reason. First, the denser the
municipality, the greater will be the local public needs and the public goods spillovers to neighboring
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localities. In order to reduce free-riding behaviour from citizens who do not live in a city but benefit from
her public good provision, the municipality will have an incentive to share or to transfer some competences
and the associated supply of services, to the inter-municipal group. We would expect a negative sign for
the share of elderly people since this category of the population has comparatively lower needs related to
this investment spending, which are financed by the inter-municipal community. However, if the existence
of a community is seen as a solution to sharing or transferring the supply of other specific services to this
population category, we should observe a positive impact. Since social services are not legally compulsory
for intermunicipal communities, the expected sign of this variable is ambiguous. 17
As usual in this spatial economic context, we cannot rule out the possibility that voluntary coope-
ration might be strongly dependent on the weighted average of neighbors’ characteristics. We perform
an alternative Durbin model specification in which the above socio-economic characteristics of neighbors
are spatial lagged covariates. There are two reasons for including these weighted average covariates in an
alternative specification of our model. First, this specification can be tested to ensure that a naive control
function a la Wooldridge, is a good choice in our context. Second, we want to capture the following eco-
nomics effects. We expect that being surrounded by richer municipalities (e.g. with higher per capita tax
revenues) would reduce the probability of cooperation since rich localities are not likely to transfer their
resources to the community. The lagged covariate associated with elderly might exhibit an ambiguous
sign for the reasons given above. Finally, a dense neighborhood might be a strong incentive to sign an
inter-municipal agreement since local government cooperation allows internalization of spillover effects in
the supply of public goods. Tables respectively report the estimations for the Spatial Lag Model in Eq (3)
and the Spatial Durbin Model in Eq (4), using the linear probability model (LPM), the L-GMM probit
and the CF approach, with the geographical matrix and the geo-political matrix. The L-GMM and CF




Tables (1) and (2) respectively report the estimations for the Spatial Lag Model in Eq. (3) and the
Spatial Durbin Model in Eq. (4), using the linear probability model (LPM), the L-GMM probit and the
CF approach, with the geographical matrix and the geo-political matrix. The L-GMM and CF estimators
are performed using W 2Xjt as instruments as well as using (W
2Xjt,WZi,t).
The estimation results show that the spatial dependence parameter (ρ) is always highly significant and
17. Due to collinearity problems, we had to remove from the estimations population, percentage of unemployed and share
of young people in the municipality i.
18. For reasons of space, Table 5 and 6 report only estimations of the ρ parameter. The estimations for the full models
are reported in Appendix E.
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Table 1 : Spatial Lag Estimation
Lag Model
Geo Matrix with cut-off Q1=59km Geo-Political Matrix with cut-off Q1=59km
Instruments: W 2X Instruments: W 2X
LPM L-GMM CF LPM L-GMM CF
ρ 0.976*** 0.874*** 0.665*** 0.925*** 0.947*** 0.648***
νˆ 0.865*** 0.335***
Instruments: (W 2X,WZi,t) Instruments: (W 2X,WZi,t)
LPM L-GMM CF LPM L-GMM CF
ρ 0.976*** 0.934*** 0.678*** 0.925*** 0.947*** 0.577***
νˆ 0.922*** 0.640***
Table 2 : Spatial Durbin Estimation
Durbin Model
Geo Matrix with cut-off Q1=59km Geo-Political Matrix with cut-off Q1=59km
Instruments: W 2X Instruments: W 2X
LPM L-GMM CF LPM L-GMM CF
ρ 0.974*** 1.075*** 0.752*** 0.922*** 0.703*** 0.569***
νˆ 0.810*** 0.418***
Instruments: (W 2X,WZi,t) Instruments: (W 2X,WZi,t)
LPM L-GMM CF LPM L-GMM CF
ρ 0.974*** 1.100*** 0.738*** 0.921*** 0.756*** 0.474***
νˆ 0.880*** 0.773***
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positive in all the columns in the Tables (6) and (7). This parameter indicates the influence of neighboring
municipalities’ cooperation decisions on the cooperation choice of municipalities. We provide evidence
that cooperation decision-making is is largely dependent on the decision of neighbours, independently of
estimation strategy and of definition of spatial matrix.
First, the territorial contiguity constraint, imposes that to cooperate two municipalities must share a
border. Obviously, a municipality is more likely to cooperate if it is surrounded by cooperating munici-
palities. We can expect also that information related to cooperation (expected revenues, expected state
grant, etc.) will be more easily obtained by an independent municipality that is located next to a group
of cooperating municipalities. This is on line with the literature on yardstick competition (Besley and
Case, 1995) and tax competition (Brueckner, 2003). An incumbent may try to avoid stigmatisation and
non-reelection by mimicking the cooperation (or isolation) decision of neighbors. The tax competition ex-
planation of this result is that local governments are likely to avoid capital flight from their territories by
cooperating in a close community, which provides a new range of public services to firms and households.
For both the lag and the Durbin models, LPM and L-GMM estimates of the spatial coefficient are
very high and close to the upper bound 1. 19 In particular, when the purely geographical matrix is used,
the LPM estimates are about 0.98 for both the lag and Durbin models, while the L-GMM estimates
rang from 0.87 in the lag model when only W 2X is used as an instrument to 1.1 in the Durbin model
when both (W 2Xjt,WZi,t) are used as instruments. This suggests that neither the linear (LPM) nor the
linerised (L-GMM) models are appropriate for modeling discrete choice variables. This is in line with
the results in Klier and McMillen (2008) which show that their L-GMM procedure tends to overestimate
the spatial coefficient when spatial correlation is very high. The estimates derived from the naive CF are
always lower (0.75 in the Durbin model with only W 2X used as an instrument, to 0.68 in the lag model
when both (W 2Xjt,WZi,t) are used as instruments), suggesting the CF approach is more appropriate
for modeling discrete choice variables.
This holds also for the geo-political matrix. In particular, all the estimates of the ρ parameter are
lower, with the exception of those derived by the L-GMM estimates of the lag model. Therefore, when
geographical and political proximity are considered simultaneously, the influence of neighbours’ decisions
on the choice to join an inter-municipal community is lower. However, even in this case the CF seems to
perform better in estimations of the spatial parameter.
When both (W 2Xjt,WZi,t) are used as instruments the CF estimates of the spatial parameters are
mostly lower, the exception being the lag model with the pure geographical matrix. This result is in line
with those in Lyytikainen (2012), which show, in the case of the linear spatial model, that employing IV
19. Given that the spatial weigh matrix considered in the estimation is row-standardised, estimates of ρ should lie in the
interval (-1,1).
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methods associated with careful choice of IV can result in more reliable estimates of the spatial interaction
term.
Since the geo-political matrix combines both criteria (distance and political proximity) at the same
time, we need to disentangle the effect of political proximity weighted by distance from ”pure” geographic
closeness on the probability to cooperate. The naive CF approach allows us to address this question by
including both matrices in the same specification and considering the two spatially lagged values of the
dependent variable (one derived from the geographical matrix and the other from the geo-political matrix)
as two different endogenous variables. The model to be estimated therefore is given by:
Ci,t = φ(ρ1 N∑
j=1wi,jCj,t + ρ2 N∑j=1wgeoPoli,j Cj,t + βX ′i,t + ηi + ei,t + νˆ1i,t + νˆ2i,t); (6)
where wi,j and w
geoPol
i,j are the spatial weights of the pure geographical matrix and geo-political matrix
respectively, ρ1 and ρ2 are the associated spatial parameters and νˆ1 and νˆ2 are the residuals of the two
first-step regressions of ∑Nj=1wi,jCj,t and ∑Nj=1wgeoPoli,j Cj,t respectively.
Table 3: CF Estimation with two different spatial matrices













The estimation results of Eq.(6) are reported in Table(3). Interestingly, we find that the spatial
parameter associated with the pure geographical matrix remains significant and positive while the spatial
coefficient associated with the geo-political matrix is no longer significant. This suggests that political
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proximity does not increase the probability of cooperation. In other words, the estimates seem to suggest
that the only effect at work is an imitation effect of geographic neighbors decisions but that imitation
effect does not apply to political belief.
Unlike Sorensen (2006), Moisio (2012), Saarima and Tukianien (2010), French data do not support
the influence of politics in the coalition decisions. We do not find a higher probability of cooperation
if municipalities share the same political leaning. In the French institutional context only ”geographic”
neighborhood seem to matter. As expected, this may be due to the specific type of cooperation imple-
mented in France. Functional cooperation differs from mergers since municipalities continue to exist as
entities after joining an inter-municipal body and mayors remain in post after joining an inter-municipal
jurisdiction. Local mayors retain some bargaining power within the community and some strategic compe-
tences within their municipal territories (i.e. responsability for local urban services, buildings, nurseries,
primary schools, sports facilities). In the case of merger, local officials disappear after creation of the
community. The political transactions costs identified by Sorensen (2006) for Norway therefore are more
powerful in mergers due to the expected changes to party strengths after unification.
The coefficient of fiscal revenues per capita (at time t-1) is negative although not significant, in all the
specifications. As expected, a high level of fiscal revenues at time t-1 reduces the probability of joining
a community whereas a financial poor locality may have stronger incentives to set an agreement with
neighboring localities. The obvious financial gains from cooperation (through the extra state grant) and
the provision of extra public goods are counterbalanced by each cooperating municipality losing some
fiscal autonomy through devolution of competences and tax revenues to the community. The lagged
covariate that gives the impact of the neighbours’ fiscal revenues on the decision to cooperate shows,
that the municipal fiscal revenues (at time t-1) of the neighboring municipalities may be relevant to the
cooperation decision. When the lagged covariate is significant, its coefficient is negative suggesting that,
being surrounded by rich municipalities does not encourage cooperation among local governments. Both
results are in line with Sorensen (2006), which shows that for Norway high-revenue municipalities prefer
not to merge with poorer neighbors.
In relation to the remaining economic and socio-demographic determinants of cooperation, once we
control for the cooperation decisions of neighborhood using the control function approach, we find that
most economic and socio-demographic characteristics of the municipalities exhibit the expected sign
(positive for density and negative for elderly people) but lose their significance.
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper explored empirically the determinants of cooperation decision-making by French munici-
palities, an interesting setting that involves municipalities decide to join an upper tier of government for
the joint provision of some public goods. This decision does not remove power from the local governments
and local mayors who retain responsibility for certain services. We tested the possibility that standard
spatial econometric techniques might overestimate the extent of mimicking behaviors in the non linear
case.
To disentangle the political, economic and socio-demographic determinants, we use a unique panel data
of 1,056 municipalities within a French region (Brittany). We employed a naive control function approach
to develop a binary discrete choice model with spatial interaction. We exploited the statutory national
tax limit as an exclusion restriction to estimate the decision to cooperate in response to neighbors’ deci-
sions; we use this instrument to increase the relevance of our set of instruments in order to avoid weak
instrument issues. The estimation results provide evidence that the choice to join an inter-municipal
community is largely dependent on the decision of geographic neighbors, independent of the estimation
strategy. We find also that French data do not support the influence of politics in the coalition decisions.
Comparison among different specifications and especially standard spatial econometrics models (SAR
and Durbin) shows that the coefficient of the spatially weighted average decision to cooperate is over
estimated by these more traditional models, which is in line with the recent applied spatial economics
literature (e.g. Lyytikainen, 2012) but are derived for the first time in a discrete choice model setting.
Further reseach should be done to enhance our understanding of the determinants of fiscal cooperation,
such as the bargaining power that a municipality may have within the intermunicipal community.
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8 Appendix
A - Local business tax
When considering the main local tax rate (local business tax rate LBT or taxe professionnelle), we
face three possible cases :
1) When the municipality does not belong to any intermunicipal group, the municipality sets the LBT
rate, the intermunicipal tax rate is zero.
2) When the municipality belongs to an intermunicipal group with additional taxation, the munici-
pality set a LBT tax rate and the intermunicipal group sets an additional tax rates (ATR) on the same
tax base.
3) When the municipality belongs to an intermunicipal group with single business tax or taxe profes-
sionnelle unique, the municipal business tax rate is zero. The intermunicipal group sets the local business
tax rate, which applies to all municipalities within the group.
Tax limitations are computed by state services every year and are communicated to all local govern-
ments at the end of year t-1 before they set their tax rates for year t. These rules depend on the tax
regimes of each municipality in both years (year t-1 and year t).
Business tax rate in year t can not exceed 2 times the average business tax rates set by all French
municipalities in year t-1.
These average tax rates are calculated as the ratio (R) between:
- the whole tax revenues of the localities and the intercommunal groups for the LBT
- and the sum of the tax bases of LBT.
This rule depends on the fiscal regimes in year t and year t-1(See Table 3’).
Table 3’: Fiscal regime
Fiscal regime of municipality i in year t
Fiscal regime of municipality i in year t-1 Additional tax Single business tax Isolated
Additional tax R-ATR R+ATR R
Single business tax R R R
Isolated R R R
B - Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 : Descriptive Statistics
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Density t1 Elderly t1 Revenues pc t1 Wdensity t1 WElderly t1 WRevenues pc t1
min 8.77 0.06 0.06 87.19 0.18 0.18
max 35281.29 0.53 7.01 4784.50 0.30 0.40
median 306.56 0.25 0.21 762.36 0.25 0.25
mean 753.59 0.25 0.25 752.25 0.25 0.25
std.dev 1928.14 0.08 0.21 491.14 0.03 0.03
Table 5 : Correlation Matrix
Density t1 Elderly t1 Revenues pc t1 Wdensity t1 WElderly t1 WRevenues pc t1
Density t1 1 0.03 0.21 0.34 -0.05 0.09
Elderly t1 0.03 1 0.02 -0.08 0.55 0.03
Revenues pc t1 0.21 0.02 1 0.05 0.03 0.24
Wdensity t1 0.34 -0.08 0.05 1 -0.06 -0.05
WElderly t1 -0.05 0.55 0.03 -0.06 1 0.28
WRevenues pc t1 0.09 0.03 0.24 -0.05 0.28 1
C - Spatial Weight Matrices
The spatial weights matrix W used in the analysis is a row-standardised matrix based on the inverse
of the great circle distance between the centroids of two municipalities i and j (denoted by dij), taking
as the maximum distance to have not zero weight the first quantile of the distance distribution (denoted
by dQ1), equal to 59 kilometres in our sample of Brittany’s municipalities. In particular, for any couple






0 if i = j
d−1ij if dij ≤ dQ1
0 if dij > dQ1.
(7)
The geo-political matrix is instead built as follows:
1. For each municipality i we construct a political colour variable PCi as:
PCi = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0.5 if municipality i voted for a right-wing candidate−0.5 if municipality i voted for a left-wing candidate.
2. Then we built a political matrix Pij such that:
Pij = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if PCi = PCj
0 otherwise.
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3. Finally, we interact the political matrix P with the distance-based matrix with cut-off W . In parti-
cular, for any couple of municipalities i and j, the value of the element wgeoPoli,j of the geo-political
matrix is given by:









d−1ij if i ≠ j, PCi = PCj and dij ≤ dQ1
0 otherwise.
(8)
D - Bootstrap procedure
Because of the two-step regression in the CF approach, the standard errors in the second stage must
be adjusted for the first-sage estimation. Following Paapke and Wooldridge (2008) we use the following
bootstrap procedure.
Given the observed sample of observations Z = (Ci,t,X ′i,t,∑Nj=1wi,jCi,j ,∑Nj=1wi,jX ′i,j) for i = 1, ...,N
and t = 1, ..., T , the bootstrap procedure consists of five steps.
1. Generate B independent bootstrap samples Z1, ..., ZB in two steps:
(a) draw with replacement N integers from the cross-sectional units (i.e. the municipalities) i =
1, ...,N ;
(b) construct the bootstrap sample taking for each bootstrapped municipality all its observations
in time and its spatially lagged variables, that is keeping both temporal and spatial structures
intact.
2. Estimate the model for each Z1, ..., ZB and take the estimated parameters of the second stage
regression.
3. Compute for each bootstrap sample, b = 1, ...,B, and for each explanatory variable, k = 1, ...,K, the
average partial effect APEbk.
4. Compute the the two-side p-value:
PBk = 2 ×min( B∑
b=1{APEbk ≤ 0},
B∑
b=1{APEbk > 0}) /B. (9)
In our estimates we set B = 300.
E - Regression Results
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Table 6 : Geo Matrix with cut-off Q1=59km.
LPM L-GMM L-GMM
Instruments: W 2X Instruments: (W 2X,WZi,t)
Lag model Durbin model Lag model Durbin model Lag model Durbin model
Intercept 0.176 1.944*** 0.102 1.819***
(0.252) (0.371) (0.252) (0.372)
ρ 0.976*** 0.974*** 0.874*** 1.074*** 0.934 1.099***
(-0.008) (0.008) (0.219) (0.096) (0.219) (0.096)
Density t1 4.967e-06** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2.784e-06) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Elderly t1 0.217 0.101 5.773*** -3,308 5.675** -3.39
(0.278) (0.295) (2.036) (2.206) (2.041) (2.209)
Revenues pc t1 0.041 0.064 -0.354 -0.205 -0.344 -0.208
(0.046) (0.047) (0.350) (0.320) 0.3478 (0.322)
mDensity t1 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
mElderly t1 -7.736*** 1.967 -7.603*** 2.045
(2.041) (2.207) (2.046) (2.211)
mRevenues pc t1 -0.029 -0.106 -0.04 -0.102
(0.360) (0.326) (0.359) (0.327)
Wdensity t1 0.000** 0.000*** 4.4e-4***
(0.000) (0.000) (1.3e-4)
WElderly t1 3.806*** 108.874*** 108.146
(1.382) (10.024) (10.778)
WRevenues pc t1 -0.622** -13.769*** -13.473***
(0.266) (1.819) (1.821)
mWdensity t1 -1.90E-04 -1.90E-04
(1.6e-04) (1.6e-4)
mWElderly t1 -108.421*** -107.475***
(10.106) -10,115
mWRevenues pc t1 5.039** 4.920**
(2.053) (2.393)
year.f2 0.301*** 0.227*** 0.300 0.223***
(0.054) (0.067) (0.054) (0.060)
year.f3 0.348*** 0.138* 0.348 0.135*
(0.054) (0.074) (0.054) (0.074)
year.f4 0.393*** 0.064 0.393 0.060
(0.055) (0.093) (0.055) (0.093)
year.f5 0.507*** 0.364*** 0.509 0,365***
(0.057) (0.117) (0.057) (0.117)
year.f6 0.703*** 0.516*** 0.705 0.513***
(0.057) (0.117) (0.057) (0.117)
year.f7 0.801*** 0.608*** 0.801 0.599***
(0.059) (0.123) (0.059) (0.123)
N. of municipalities 7392
Notes: (i) In LPM and L-GMM coefficients are reported.
(ii) Standard errors in parenthesis.
(iii) Significance levels: ***1%, ** 5% , *10%.
(iv) Dependent variable: Ci,t
(v) All covariates are lagged by one period to avoid endogeneity problems.
(vi) mDensity t1, mElderly t1, mRevenues pc t1, mWdensity t1, mWElderly t1 and
mWRevenues pc t1 are the Mundlack variables.
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Table 7 : Geo Matrix with cut-off Q1=59km.
CF CF
Instruments: W 2X Instruments: (W 2X,WZi,t)
Lag model Durbin model Lag model Durbin model
Intercept -0.245*** -0.388 -0.256*** -0.34
(0.069) (0.278) (0.061) (0.253)
ρ 0.664*** 0.751*** 0.677*** 0.738***
(0.078) (0.135) (0.070) (0.131)
νˆ 0.865*** 0.809*** 0.922*** 0.879***
(0.114) (0.135) (0.105) (0.179)
Density t1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Elderly t1 -0.849 -0.317 -0.929 -0.325
(0.641) (0.644) (0.609) (0.590)
Revenues pc t1 -0.067 -0.044 -0.07 -0.045
(0.060) (0.700) (0.0721) (0.067)
mDensity t1 0.1e-04* 0.1e-04 0.1e-04** 0.1e-04**
(0.000) (0.1e-04) (0.1e-04) (0.1e-04)
mElderly t1 0.487 0.051 0.585 0.071
(0.637) (0.647) (0.601) (0.586)
mRevenues pc t1 p.c 0.008 -0.016 0.008 -0.015
(0.075) (0.096) (0.086) (0.098)
WDensity t1 0.000 0.1e-04
(0.2e-04) (0.2e-04)
WElderly t1 -5.293 -5.653
(4.614) (4.764)
WRevenues pc t1 -0.711 -0.671
(0.752) (0.760)
mWDensity t1 0.1e-04 0.2e-04
(0.7e-04) (0.7e-04)
mWElderly t1 5.087 5.392
(4.740) (4.793)
mWRevenues pc t1 0.938 0.780
(1.035) (0.980)
year.f2 -0.014 -0.01 -0.017* -0.011
(0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
year.f3 -0.022* -0.006 -0,026*** -0.006
(0.12) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015)
year.f4 -0.211 0.007 -0.023* 0.009
(0.014) (0.018) (0.012) (0.019)
year.f5 -1.70E-04 0.038 -0.004 0.041*
(0.017) (0.025) (0.016) (0.025)
year.f6 0.010 0.059* 0.005 0.062**
(0.022) (0.030) (0.214) (0.032)
year.f7 0.045* 0.108** 0.041 0.114***
(0.027) (0.036) (0.026) (0.040)
N. of municipalities 7392
Notes: (i) In CF average partial effect are reported.
(ii) Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
(iii) Significance levels: ***1%, ** 5% , *10%.
(iv) Dependent variable: Ci,t
(v) All covariates are lagged by one period to avoid endogeneity problems.
(vi) mDensity t1, mElderly t1, mRevenues pc t1, mWdensity t1, mWElderly t1 and
mWRevenues pc t1 are the Mundlack variables.
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Table 8 : Geo-Political Matrix with cut-off Q1=59km.
LPM L-GMM L-GMM
Instruments: W 2X Instruments: (W 2X,WZi,t)
Lag model Durbin model Lag model Durbin model Lag model Durbin model
Intercept 0.113 2.851*** 0.095 2.608***
(0.238) (0.301) (0.238) (2.608)
ρ 0.925*** 0.921*** 0.947*** 0.703*** 0.947*** 0.756***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.206) (0.104) (0.207) (0.104)
Density t1 5.42e-06** 5.07e-06** 0.3e-04 0.3e-04 0.3e-04 0.3e-04
(0.213e-05) (2.18e-06) (0.2e-04) (0.2e-04) (0.2e-04) (0.2e-04)
Elderly t1 0.308 0.180 5.007 -2.428 5.155** -2.518
(0.279) (0.294) (2.024) (2.143) (2.035) (2.152)
Revenues pc t1 0.028 0.039 -0.373 -0.363 -0.343 -0.371
(0.046) (0.047) (0.354) (0.337) (0.350) (0.341)
mDensity t1 0.3e-04 0.3e-04 0.3e-04* 0.4e-4
(0.2e-04) (0.2e-04) (0.2e-04) (0.2e-04)
mElderly t1 -6.999 1.034 -7.105*** 1.113
(2.02979) (2.145) (2.040) (2.153)
mRevenues pc t1 -0.013*** 0.001 -0.039 0.012
(0.363) (0.342) (0.360) (0.344)
WDensity t1 1.89e-05 1.6e-04*** 0.17e-03***
(1.53e-05) (0.5e-04) (0.05e-03)
WElderly t1 2.576** 99.604*** 99.439***
(1.216) (5.668) (5.6888)
WRevenues pc t1 -0.329 -5.178*** -4.994***
(0.232) (0.548) (0.550)
mWDensity t1 -2.20E-04 -2.30E-04
(0.9e-04) (0.9e-04)















N. of municipalities 7392
Notes: (i) In LPM and L-GMM coefficients are reported.
(ii) Standard errors in parenthesis.
(iii) Significance levels: ***1%, ** 5% , *10%.
(iv) Dependent variable: Ci,t
(v) All covariates are lagged by one period to avoid endogeneity problems.
(vi) mDensity t1, mElderly t1, mRevenues pc t1, mWdensity t1, mWElderly t1 and
mWRevenues pc t1 are the Mundlack variables.
*
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Table 9 : Geo-Political Matrix with cut-off Q1=59km.
CF CF
Instruments: W 2X Instruments: (W 2X,WZi,t)
Lag model Durbin model Lag model Durbin model
Intercept -0.245*** -0.106 -0.188*** 0.082
(0.082) (0.305) (0.067) (0.213)
ρ 0.647*** 0.568*** 0.577*** 0.473***
(0.098) (0.205) (0.083) (0.120)
νˆ 0.335*** 0.418** 0.639*** 0.773***
(0.112) (0.203) (0.116) (0.150)
Density t1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Elderly t1 -0.653 -0.32 -0.72 -0.425
(0.615) (0.609) (0.647) (0.660)
Revenues pc t1 -0.114** -0.07 -0.116*** -0.072
(0.079) (0.068) (0.068) (0.065)
mDensity t1 0.1e-04 0.1e-04 0.1e-04* 0.1e-04
(0.1e-04) (0.1e-04) (0.1e-04) (0.1e-04)
mElderly t1 0.304 0.008 0.372 0.139
(0.620) (0.624) (0.650) (0.650)
mRevenues pc t1 0.051 0.009 0.046 0.008
(0.088) (0.087) (0.070) (0.093)
WDensity t1 0.1e-04 0.1e-04
(0.1e-04) (0.1e-04)
WElderly t1 0.101 0.976
(4.772) (3.756)
WRevenues pc t1 -1.394 -1.319**
(0.570) (0.585)
mWDensity t1 -0.00001 0.000
(0.4e-04) (0.5e-04)
mWElderly t1 -0.356 -1.441
(5.077) (3.917)
mWRevenues pc t1 1.141 0.801
(0.686) (0.683)
year.f2 -0.00231 0.015 (-1.47e-03) 0.015
0.01216 (0.017) (0.010) (0.012)
year.f3 -0.00472 0.022 -3.65E-03 0.022
0.01394 (0.018) (0.012) (0.013)
year.f4 -0.00202 0.036* 1.10e-03 0.036**
0.01594 (0.019) (0.013) (0.017)
year.f5 0.01620 0.070** 0.022 0.068***
0.02069 (0.025) (0.016) (0.024)
year.f6 0.02658 0.096** 0.036* 0.096***
0.02643 (0.031) (0.022) (0.029)
year.f7 0.05346 0.138*** 0.067*** 0.141***
0.03028 (0.036) (0.027) (0.035)
N. of municipalities 7392
Notes: (i) In CF average partial effect are reported.
(ii) Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
(iii) Significance levels: ***1%, ** 5% , *10%.
(iv) Dependent variable: Ci,t
(v) All covariates are lagged by one period to avoid endogeneity problems.
(vi) mDensity t1, mElderly t1, mRevenues pc t1, mWdensity t1, mWElderly t1 and
mWRevenues pc t1 are the Mundlack variables.
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Table 10 : Estimates with two different spatial matrices.
CF CF
Instruments: W 2X Instruments: (W 2X,WZi,t)
Lag model Durbin model Lag model Durbin model
Intercept -0,181** 0.198 -0.25*** -0.331
(0.092) (0.647) (0.073) (0.282)
ρ1 0.642*** 0.642*** 0.594*** 0.627***
(0.193) (0.185) (0.160) (0.195)
ρ2 -0.063 -0.242 0.074 0.106
(0.236) (0.373) (0.165) (0.187)
νˆ1 0.806*** 0.779*** 0.891*** 0.876***
(0.146) (0.180) (0.167) (0.221)
νˆ2 0.143 0.369 0.034 0.9e-03
(0.176) (0.374) (0.160) (0.208)
Density t1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Elderly t1 -0.763 -0.439 -0.925 -0.321
(0.657) (0.672) (0.637) (0.638)
Revenues pc t1 -0.072 -0,031 -0.073 -0.047
(0.071) (0.074) (0.070) (0.070)
mDensity t1 0.1e-04** 0.1e-04* 0.1e-04** 0.000*
(0.1e-04) (0.1e-04) (0.1e-04) (0.000)
mElderly t1 0.387 0.140 0.582 0.072
(0.659) (0.684) (0.645) (0.625)
mRevenues pc t1 0.011 -0,024 0.011 -0.013
(0.086) (0.095) (0.083) (0.100)
WgeoDensity t1 0.2e-04 0.000
(0.3e-04) (0.000)
WgeoElderly t1 3.567 -5.567
(9.693) (4.953)
WgeoRevenues pc t1 -1.413 -0.682
(1.044) (0.756)
mWgeoDensity t1 0.3e-04 0.000
(0.7e-04) (0.1e-03)
mWgeoElderly t1 -4.027 5.289
(9.984) (5.083)
mWgeoRevenues pc t1 0.597 0.775
(1.110) (1.014)
year.f2 -0.005 0.013 -0,017 -0,011
(0.013) (0.026) (0.010) (0.012)
year.f3 -0.012 0.012 -0.02525* -0.006
(0.015) (0.023) (0.012) (0.015)
year.f4 -0.009 0.020 -0.022 0.0100
(0.017) (0.022) (0.013) (0.0190)
year.f5 0.014 0.059** -0,003 0.0419
(0.022) (0.032) (0.017) (0.0246)
year.f6 0.030 0.085** 0,007 0.0629*
(0.029) (0.040) (0.022) (0.0314)
year.f7 0.068* 0.134*** 0.044 0.1145***
(0.068) (0.045) (0.026) (0.0387)
N. of municipalities 7392
Notes: (i) In CF average partial effect are reported.
(ii) Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
(iii) Significance levels: ***1%, ** 5% , *10%.
(iv) Dependent variable: Ci,t
(v) All covariates are lagged by one period to avoid endogeneity problems.
(vi) mDensity t1, mElderly t1, mRevenues pc t1, mWdensity t1, mWElderly t1 and
mWRevenues pc t1 are the Mundlack variables.
31
